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I. INTRODUCTION
President Obama has described the most recent U.S. economic downturn as
the "worst financial crisis since the Great Depression."' Perhaps
unsurprisingly, with the global collapse of credit markets, the failure of
massive private institutions, and a widespread drop in profit-margins across all
sectors, the financial crisis has resulted in a particularly pernicious
environment for the nation's workforce. 2 In 2009, American workers faced not
only massive layoffs and terminations,3 but also double-digit unemployment
rates4 and record levels of underemployment. 5 These job losses have led to a
host of fiscal and budgetary problems, most notably, massive budget deficits
for the federal government and many state governments alike,6 a surge in
unemployment insurance claim filings, 7 and a sharp uptick in welfare and
1. Joseph Curl, McCain Pledges Homeowner Help: Seeks to Buy up Bad Mortgages;
Obama Blames Bush for Crisis, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at A 1.
2. See Alan Krueger, Does the Financial Crisis Threaten Your Job?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29,
2008, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/29/does-the-financial-crisis-threaten-your-job;
Timeline: Credit Crunch to Downturn, BBC NEWS, Aug. 7, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
7521250.stm.
3. Maura Reynolds & Walter Hamilton, Job Losses in U.S. Soar to 16-Year High, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009, at CI. Since December 2007, the United States has witnessed a loss of 3.6
million jobs. Id. The number of cuts by employers in January 2009, was "the biggest for any
single month since 1974." Id.
4. Louis Uchitelle, In Surprise, Jobless Rate Fell to 10% in November, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
5, 2009, at Al. The 2009 fiscal year was a very harsh period for American workers; in January
alone, the economy lost 598,000 jobs and the national unemployment rate hit a high of 7.6
percent. Neil Irwin & Annys Shin, 598,000 Jobs Shed in Brutal January, WASH. POST, Feb. 7,
2009, at Al. The unemployment rate in the United States rose to 10.2 percent in October.
Uchitelle, supra.
5. Jenna Fisher, Underemployed: For Some U.S. Workers, Now Any Job Will Do, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 23, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/society/2009/
1224/Underemployment-For-some-US-workers-now-any-job-will-do. The Bloomberg "U.S.
Unemployed & Margin & Part Time as Percentage of Labor Force and Margin," also known as
the USUDMAER Index, includes the "[t]otal unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers,
plus total employed part time for economic reasons, as a percent of the civilian labor force plus
all marginally attached workers." USUDMAER:IND, BLOOMBERG, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/ apps/quote?ticker=USUDMAER%3A[ND (emphasis added);
Babson Capital Management LLC, Marco Overview, BABSON CAP., Third Quarter 2009, at 1, 2,
available at http://www.babsoncapital.com/BabsonCapitallhttp/bcstaticfiles/Research/file/Babson
%20Capital%20StafP/o2OLetter_2009Q3.pdf.
6. See Deficit Tops $176 Billion in October, Sets Record as U.S. Borrowing Climbs,
WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2009, at A16; Elizabeth McNichol & Iris J. Law, State Budget Troubles
Worsen, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, May 18, 2009, at 1, available at
http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/docs/center-bpp-state-budget-deficits.pdf
(discussing the financial crisis that the states are facing and noting that "[a]t least 46 states faced
or are facing shortfalls in their budgets for this and/or next year").
7. See, e.g., North Carolina Unemployment Claims Crash Website, USA TODAY,
Jan. 6, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-01-06-ncarolina-unemploymentN.htm
(noting that "[ulnemployment is up so much in North Carolina that the state's Interet site for
benefits crashed twice this week under a rush of claims").
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food-stamp applications and disbursements.
8
These trends depict a disturbing American labor market and illustrate the
harsh impact that the economic recession continues to have on the American
workforce. However, the current economic downturn has only served to
underscore and ultimately exacerbate the certain longstanding problems facing
American workers.9 These problems consist of two prongs. The first prong
represents a deterioration in workplace quality, manifested by a marked decline
in quality of life, a steady decrease in the provision of defined-benefit pension
plans and healthcare benefits, the failure of wages to keep up with inflation, a
growing disparity between rich and poor, and an ever-dwindling middle
class. 10 The second prong, on the other hand, reflects a paucity of workplace
certainty. The vast majority of workers in the United States retains only
marginal security in their employment due to the American "at-will"
employment (or "employment-at-will") scheme, which places them in a greatly
disadvantaged position relative to their employers."
As the economy continues to hemorrhage jobs and widespread
unemployment continues to consume abnormally-large amounts of government
funding, the need for meaningful labor reform is evident. Currently,
employment-rights advocates have focused reform efforts predominantly on
the enactment of union-enabling legislation, that is, making it easier for
employees to organize, form unions, and negotiate contracts.1 2 These reforms,
it is argued, are the most practicable mechanisms for ensuring the most
favorable, equitable, and livable conditions of employment for American
8. See Sara Murray, Numbers on Welfare See Sharp Increase, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2009,
at A]; see, e.g., Idaho, Other States Looking to Expand Food Stamps, THESTREET.COM, Mar. 9,
2009, http://www.thestreet.com/story/10469336/l/idaho-other-states-looking-to-expand-food-
stamps.html (discussing the likely increase in applicants if qualifications in Idaho can change);
Carl Manning, Feds Give Kansas More Jobless, Food Stamp Benefits, THESTREET.COM, Mar. 9,
2009, http://www.thestreet.com/story/I 0469585/feds-give-kansas-more-jobless-food-stamps-
benefits.html (noting an increase in food stamp recipients' benefits in Kansas due to the federal
stimulus package).
9. Bernanke: 'Fundamentally Optimistic' About Economy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2009,
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2009/4/14/bernanke-fundamentally-optimistic-about-
economy/tab/article.
10. See, e.g., Patrice Hill, Income Gap Grows in U.S., WASH. TIMES, July 31, 2005, at Al.
11. Jason Lemons, Comment, For Any Reason or No Reason at All: Reconciling
Employment-at-Will with the Rights of Texas Workers After Mission Petroleum Carriers, Inc. v.
Solomon, 35 ST. MARY'S L.J. 741, 741-51, 766-68 (2004).
12. Telephone Interview with Paul Sonn, Legal Co-Director of the Nat'l Employment Law
Project (Mar. 3, 2009) (defining the at-will employment doctrine as "any employment
relationship not governed by a contract or a statutory provision is terminable at any time by either
the employer or employee for any reason or no reason at all" and discussing the doctrine's
proponents and critics).
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workers. 13  However, although these reforms are designed, in theory, to
address the quality- and certainty-based problems facing American workers, in
their present form they do little to confront the fundamental workplace
problems related to employment security.
To adequately address the issues comprising the "certainty" prong of the
workplace predicament facing at-will employees, corresponding reform should
also be implemented. For purposes of this Article, these reforms, which focus
on the allocation of authority directly to employees rather than unions, whether
arising under statute or common law, are referred to as "direct-allocation"
reforms. Alternatively, those approaches that concentrate on the grant of
power to employees by means of labor and trade unions are labeled "indirect-
allocation" reforms, because, rather than granting power directly to individual
workers, it is conferred to the union as a proxy. The main objective of direct-
allocation reform is to provide employees with certainty and security in their
relationships with employers, as well as in their employment.' 4 This aim is of
great importance because, although the indirect approach offers valuable and
necessary protection for workers, it does not presently address the source of a
great deal of workplace inequality-the inherent uncertainty engendered by the
American employment-at-will scheme.15
This scheme currently governs employment relationships in forty-nine of the
fifty American states. During the course of ordinary, non-contractual
employment, neither employer nor employee is legally bound to maintain the
parties' employment relationship for any specific duration.1 7  Because this
system allows employers to discharge employees for almost any reason, it
inherently places workers in a drastically subordinate position relative to their
employers. For this reason, several common law and statutory exceptions to
the at-will scheme have been put in place that restrict employers' ability to
terminate workers, thereby giving employees greater control over their
employment. 
18
13. See, e.g., What is the Employee Free Choice Act?, SEIU.ORG, http://seiu.org/a/what-is-
the-employee-free-choice-act.php (endorsing a bill that would make it easier "for workers to join
together and bargain for wages that support a family and quality, affordable heathcare").
14. See infra Part ll.B.
15. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. Perhaps, alongside the direct allocation
efforts discussed in this Article, labor unions can secure even greater positions of power and
effectuate more efficient safeguards against unfair termination. However, that unions possess the
ability to undertake such sweeping reform is increasingly unlikely. See infra notes 91-95 and
accompanying text.
16. See FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 131 (Karen E. Ford et al. eds., 2d ed.
2000); David J. Walsh & Joshua L. Schwartz, State Common Law Wrongful Discharge Doctrines,
Up-Date, Refinement, and Rationales, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 645, 678-89 (1996). Montana is the only
outlier to the at-will rule; for a discussion of Montana's employment scheme, see infra note 41.
17. See Tara J. Radin & Patricia H. Werhane, Employment-at-Will, Employee Rights and
Future Directions for Employment, 13 Bus. ETHICS Q. 13, 113 (2003).
18. See infra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
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This Article maintains that in order to better allocate the innate power
imbalance of the American at-will employment system, a two-pronged
approach would provide more robust protection for American workers, as
compared to the current emphasis exclusively on rebuilding labor unions. This
Article notes that reform incorporating the direct-allocation approach would
provide an effective counterpart to the indirect-allocation reforms labor
activists choose to endorse in terms of political feasibility and overall
effectiveness. It further suggests that the implementation of direct-allocation
reforms would ultimately create a complementary and reciprocal relationship
with any indirect-allocation efforts, thus providing a firmer basis upon which
to broaden the rights of American workers and potentially strengthen the
ability of labor unions to secure the most favorable collective bargaining
agreements for their constituent members.
This Article will proceed in four Parts. In Part I, this Article briefly
discusses the historical development of both the indirect- and direct-allocation
approaches, examines their roles in contemporary employment law
jurisprudence, and explores the reciprocal relationship these two types of
reform would provide one another. In Part II, this Article outlines the contours
of direct-allocation reforms and discusses the possible manifestations of such
efforts, namely the expansion of certain exceptions to the at-will doctrine. In
an effort to delineate the most effective means with which to combat enduring
problems in the contemporary labor-market, Part I also discusses the benefits
of the direct-allocation options and contrasts these benefits with the indirect
approach. Part III explores several reform proposals and analyzes the extent to
which each is capable of effectuating the direct allocation aims through federal
legislation, including provisions requiring employer notice prior to
termination, a warning and cure arrangement for underperforming workers,
and a federal severance-pay requirement. 19 This Part concludes that a federal
notice requirement would present the most prudent means to protect workers
because it would provide for incremental reform that balances the dual
constraints of political feasibility and overall effectiveness. Finally, Part IV
discusses the interplay between the direct-allocation proposal and the current
union-focused reform efforts. The Article concludes that, even for advocates
of allocating power to labor unions to promote greater equality in the
American workplace, the implementation of direct-allocation reforms could
serve to bolster organized labor initiatives in the future by granting all
employees greater levels of security and certainty when negotiating with
employers.
19. On its face, a severance requirement does not change the operation of the at-will system
in the traditional sense; however, such an obligation would constrain employers' ability to freely
terminate workers, thereby giving employees greater power and bargaining leverage. See infra
Part III.B.3; see also infra note 135.
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I. AN OVERVIEW: THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIRECT- AND
DIRECT-ALLOCATION APPROACHES
A. The Indirect-Allocation Approach
Labor and trade unions have existed in one form or another for centuries.
20
In the United States, the modem American organized labor movement can be
traced back to foundational legislation of the New Deal era. The most
significant legislation is the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
which prohibits employers from terminating, harassing, or otherwise retaliating
against employees due to their membership or activity in labor unions.2I The
NLRA also empowers employees to form labor unions in order to engage in
collective bargaining negotiations with employers and protects the rights of
unionized workers to take part in "concerted activity," such as participating in
strikes or protests. 22 In the past century, since this legislation's enactment,
American labor unions have secured many fundamental reforms for workers,
including the implementation of the social security system and the
standardization of wages and work hours.
Labor unions' ability to improve the quality of workplace conditions derives
from the unions' power to bargain collectively on behalf of member
employees. Collective bargaining is generally defined as "the decision-making
process whereby employers and unions negotiate the wages and conditions of
employment,, 24 often resulting in "a signed, legally enforceable agreement.,
25
In addition to taking part in collective bargaining, labor unions provide other
crucial benefits and protections to their members,26 including lobbying for
20. See SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM 1-2 (1894). The
predecessors of contemporary American labor unions began as offshoots of the medieval guild
system, but, in their current institutional manifestation, "labor unions have existed only in the past
200 years-that is, with the advent of the Industrial Revolution." J.C. DOCHERTY, HISTORICAL
DICTIONARY OF ORGANIZED LABOR I (2d ed. 2004). Generally, unions are defined as "a
continuous association of wage-earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the
conditions of their employment." WEBB & WEBB, supra, at 1. A more modem definition is a
"voluntary organization[] of employees created to defend or improve the pay and conditions of
their members through bargaining with their employers." DOCHERTY, supra, at 1.
21. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006). In part, this Act prevents
employers from interfering with union membership or discouraging employees from joining a
union. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a).
22. Id. § 157.
23. PAUL FINKELMAN & PETER WALLENSTEIN, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
POLITICAL HISTORY 225-26 (2001).
24. DOCHERTY, supra note 20, at 65.
25. Id. at 16.
26. Union efforts and collective bargaining agreements often benefit nonmembers as well
by improving wages, benefits, and workplace conditions; however, it appears that nonmembers
typically do not benefit as much as union members do. See, e.g., Edward J. Schumacher, What
Explains Wage Differences Between Union Members and Covered Nonmembers?, 65 S. ECON. J.
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positive legislation and political candidates, and organizing protests,
slowdowns, strikes, and lockouts if necessary to achieve their objectives.27
Conceptually, by employing these tactics, unions should be able to
counteract the negative effects of the American at-will scheme. Regardless, as
long as a surplus of labor exists, employers are more easily able to find
substitute labor than workers are able to gain employment, particularly in
unskilled positions; labor unions theoretically help counteract this imbalance.
Thus, due to this innate divergence of incentives, employers are able to
terminate workers for almost any reason with little-to-no consequence, and
non-contract employees are left with an utter lack of job security in their
positions. 28 Particularly, in the aftermath of the current financial crisis, with
millions of jobs drying up, employers are able to shed jobs more freely, leaving
terminated employees with no opportunity to plan for unemployment or obtain
substitute employment in any capacity.29 Unions, by allowing workers to pool
their individual negotiating power together, are able to better even out this
power differential because organized unions enjoy more bargaining leverage in
the aggregate than any individual worker could achieve on his own.
Nonetheless, over the course of the past several decades, industry advocates
and politicians have assailed the organized labor movement in the United
States.30 Perhaps the turning point in this "war on unions" came in the early
days of the Reagan presidency:
[a]n important turning point came in 1981, shortly after
[President] Reagan took office, when he fired about 12,000 federal
air traffic controllers who went out on strike. The controllers-
represented by one of the few unions that supported Reagan in his
bid for presidency, the Professional Air Traffic Controllers'
Organization or PATCO-were fired for violating a law that forbids
federal workers from striking. By carrying out his threat to fire the
controllers if they did not return to work Reagan not only set limits
493, 493 (1999) (noting that "[a]n individual covered by a collective bargaining agreement but
who is not a union member is estimated to earn about 13% lower wages than a union member").
27. LAURENCE OLIVO & PETER MCKERACHER, LABOUR RELATIONS: THE UNIONIZED
WORKPLACE 132-37 (2005). See, e.g., Matthew J. Brouillette & Jeffrey R. Williams, How
School Employee Labor Unions Politicize Government Schools, MACKINAC CENTER FOR PUBLIC
POLICY, June 23, 1999, http://www.mackinac.org/article/aspx?ID=1941&print=yes (discussing
the political methods school unions use to advance their agendas).
28. Presumably, in a few instances, the costs of locating and training new employees may
be significant. But, in unskilled employ or in manufacturing positions that require minimal
training, these costs are not likely to be obstacles to finding substitute workers in a labor surplus.
29. See, e.g., Lucia Mutikani, Employers Slash Jobs in Dec, Pressuring Obama, REUTERS,
Jan. 8, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5B92XZ20100108.
30. See Kate Brofenbrenner, A War Against Organizing, WASH. POST, June 3, 2009, at Al 9
(examining tactics taken by employers to prevent the formation and continuation of unions).
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for public employee unions, but also signaled that it was OK for
businesses to play hardball with private sector unions.
31
By summarily terminating the members of PATCO, President Reagan's
actions demonstrated that American labor-policy was in a state of flux and that
the federal government's relationship with labor unions was undergoing a
marked shift. This presidential "union-busting" created negative repercussions
for organized labor, both in the immediate aftermath of the firings and in the
years thereafter:
[Reagan's actions] sent a clear message to the corporations that
union-busting was on the immediate agenda. By 1987, nearly three-
quarters of all contracts covering 1,000 or more workers included
wage concessions. Approximately 200,000 workers abandoned their
unions through decertification elections in the 1980s. By the end of
the decade, union membership had declined to 16 per cent of the
American labor force. Workers lacked an effective, progressive
labor movement that could fight for higher living standards.
32
The deterioration of the American organized labor movement has continued
up to the present day. During the past half-century, there has been a "steep
decline in the percentage of organized private-sector employees-from 35
percent in 1954 to 23.6 percent in 1980 to just 7.6 percent [in 2009]." 33
Inevitably, the reasons given for the current decline in unionization depend
largely on one's view toward organized labor in general. Union advocates
believe that the decline is caused by aggressive anti-union abuses by
employers, underscoring the need for new substantive pro-union legislation.
34
Union critics, on the other hand, argue that the decline of unions is due to a
combination of overzealous union demands, the resultant alienation of
employers, and other factors, such as "[g]lobal competition, deregulation and
the decline of U.S. industries ... Still, despite the recent decline in union
activity, union advocates assert that now is the opportune time to introduce
legislation that would help them recapture the ground they once held, thereby
31. Stacy Hirsh, Reagan Presidency Pivotal for Unions, BALT. SUN, June 8, 2004, at Cl.
32. Manning Marable, Rethinking Black Liberation: Towards a New Protest Paradigm, 38
RACE & CLASS 1, 3-4 (1997).
33. Peter Kirsanow, Employee No Choice Act, NAT'L REv., Mar. 23, 2009, at 25.
34. See infra Part IV; see also Robert B. Reich, ECFA -The Sooner It's Enacted, The Better,
POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/arena/perm/RobertBReich_574EOE25-4A34-4A10-8624-
5358F5A74201.html (last visited July 23, 2010).
35. Kirsanow, supra note 33, at 25; see With GM's Wagoner Ousted, Should Union Head
Have Met the Same Fate?, Fox NEWS, Mar. 31, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/
2009/03/31/gms-wagoner-ousted-union-head-met-fate/ (last visited May 17, 2010) (commenting
that despite "massive concessions" the United Auto Workers (UAW), union critics claim that the
UAW hastened GM's downfall by requiring excessive wages, pension rates and health benefits
for its members).
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providing 36American workers with greater levels of workplace power
authority.
Currently, legislation that union advocates claim would accomplish this goal
has been introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives.37 If enacted, this
legislation, entitled the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), would permit the
formation and certification of labor unions without use of the "secret balloting"
process, as currently required under the NLRA.38 The EFCA, which is further
discussed in Part IV, instead would authorize a process known as "card check,"
which "allow[s] workers to be certified as a bargaining unit if a majority
signed cards indicating their support for a union." 39  This Act, advocates
believe, must be implemented immediately to begin the process of restoring
fair working-conditions and wages, rebuilding the middle class, and,
ultimately, strengthening the American economy as a whole.4 °
B. The Direct-Allocation Approach
Although the EFCA and similar union-building legislation may be a
concrete step toward remedying workplace inequality, the fundamental
inequities built into the American at-will employment scheme require farther-
reaching action. In all but one state, Montana, the at-will system governs non-
contractual employment relationships. 41  This system provides that, in the
36. See, e.g., Reich, supra note 34 (calling for quick passage of union-enhancing
legislation).
37. Telephone Interview with Paul Sonn,supra note 12; see Employee Free Choice Act,
H.R. 1409, 111 th Cong. §§ 1-2 (2009).
38. Compare National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (2006) (requiring a
secret-ballot election if the Board finds that "a question of representation exists" after an
investigative hearing concerning such matter), with Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 1409
("[T]he Board shall not direct an election but shall certify the individual or labor organization as
the representative .... ").
39. James Oliphant, Pro-Union Bill Loses Key Supporters, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2009, at
A16. The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) also toughens sanctions against employers for
violating employees' rights to organize and take part in union activity. Id.
40. James Pletcher, Jr., Employee Free Choice Act Draws Labor Support, Conservative
Opposition, UNIONTOWN HERALD-STANDARD, Apr. 19, 2009, available at http://www.
heraldstandard.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=20300532&BRD=2280&PAG=461 &dept id=46838
7&rfi=6; see infra note 137 and accompanying text.
41. RAYMOND L. HOGLER, EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: LAW,
POLICY, AND PRACTICE 236-37 (2004). Montana still uses the at-will system to some extent; a
worker may be fired without cause during the six-month probationary period. However, after
probation, the employee may only be fired for cause. Id.
Still, other jurisdictions, such as California, may be slowly rejecting the at-will system:
In California, as in most states, employment at-will is on its way out. This is true
despite Labor Code Section 2922 and despite the California Supreme Court's holding
in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. It is on its way out for the same reason that other
legal rules wither and disappear: it is increasingly incongruous with the legal and social
fabric of which it is a part.
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absence of a written contract between the employer and employee providing
otherwise, both may leave the employment relationship freely. Moreover,
under the at-will scheme, "the term of employment is of indefinite duration,
the employer can terminate the employee for good cause, bad cause, or no
cause at all.",4 3 Ironically, the primary rationale for the implementation of the
employment-at-will system in the first place was that it would put the
employer and employee on "equal footing in terms of bargaining power.
, 44
However, the notion that the at-will doctrine inherently provides employers
and employees comparable bargaining positions has been almost universally
discarded by American courts and legislatures.45 Opponents of the at-will
scheme have concluded that its impact upon workers "has become incongruous
with our social norms, with our views of who we are as a polity, and with the
kind of society in which we want to live. To put the matter bluntly,
employment at-will should be given notice and dismissed."4 6
However, several exceptions exist to the default employment-at-will
scheme, arising under both statutory and common law, and they serve to limit
an employer's ability to legally terminate employees. 47 This Article addresses
three relevant common law exceptions to the at-will doctrine. The first, the
"implied contract," is recognized in thirty-eight states and makes enforceable
an agreement "between an employer and employee, even though no express,
written instrument regarding the employment relationship exists," even if,
depending on the jurisdiction, disclaimers are made to the contrary.48 The
implied-contract exception typically arises when employers fail to live up to
"oral or written representations [made] to employees regarding job security or
procedures that will be followed when adverse employment actions are
taken."
4 9
Joseph Grodin, Toward a Wrongful Termination Statute for California, 42 HASTINGs L.J. 135,
135 (1990).
42. Charles J. Muhl, The Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions, 124
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 3 (2001); see Janet Gilligan Abaray, Note, The Development of
Exceptions to At-Will Employment: A Review of the Case Law from Management's Viewpoint, 51
U. CIN. L. REV. 616 passim (1982) (discussing the doctrine and its exceptions and arguing that
courts should continue to retain it).
43. Muhl, supra note 42, at 3.
44. Id.
45. See Radin & Werhane, supra note 17, at 113-27.
46. Grodin, supra note 41, at 138; see Radin & Werhane, supra note 17, at 127 (arguing that
employment-at-will is a default that should be augmented by employment practices that
emphasize professionalism and respect).
47. See generally Abaray, supra note 42 (discussing the exceptions to at-will employment
that are recognized by various states).
48. Muhl, supra note 42, at 7-8 (explaining, in addition, that many courts in these thirty-
eight states found "that the contents and representations made in employee handbooks could
create an implied contract").
49. Id.
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Next, the covenant of good faith and fair-dealing exception involves "an
implied promise . . . that the employer will not terminate the employee
arbitrarily or without cause. 50  This exception closely resembles the "for
cause" employment doctrines seen in Europe and Canada; in the United States,
however, it has only been adopted by a handful of jurisdictions.
5 1
Finally, the public policy exception "generally prohibits an employer from
terminating an employee because the employee exercised a statutory right,
refused to violate the law, or otherwise acted to further the public interest."
52
The public-policy exception offers the broadest support among the states and
has the Botential to provide a variety of protections to a wide swath of
workers.
In addition to these common law exceptions, 54 a number of federal statutory
exceptions to the at-will scheme also exist, including the National Labor
Relations Act,55 the Equal Pay Act,56 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 57 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,58 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act.59 The passage of these statutory exceptions has often tracked
significant social or economic movements, such as the Civil Rights Movement,
the New Deal, and the Women's Equality Movement. 6  In effect, these
statutory exceptions were implemented because the U.S. Congress no longer
deemed it socially tolerable for employers to possess the unmitigated ability to
terminate an employee, especially based on discrimination, criminality, and
retaliation. Conceptually, these statutes fall under the general heading of
50. Labor and Employment Law Blog, http://www.laborandemploymentlawblog.com/2008/
02/employment-at-w.html (Feb. 21, 2008).
51. Muhl, supra note 42, at 10-11; see infra text accompanying notes 71-74 (discussing the
doctrines of Europe and Canada).
52. Labor and Employment Law Blog, supra note 50.
53. Muhl, supra note 42, at 4-7.
54. Employment law is generally the subject of state jurisdiction and many states have
enacted statutory exceptions to the at-will system. However, because this Article focuses on
federal employment jurisprudence and reform, an in-depth discussion of state legislative
exceptions to the employment-at-will scheme falls outside the scope of this discussion.
55. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
56. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).
57. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
58. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(2006).
59. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
60. See, e.g., Teaching With Documents: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal
Opportunity Commission, THE U.S. NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORD ADMIN,
http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/civil-rights-act (last visited July 23, 2010); This
Month in New Deal History: A Calendar of Some of the Notable Events and Dates in the History
of the United States During the Roosevelt Administration, THE NEW DEAL NETWORK, Feb. 19,
2010, http://newdeal.feri.org/search -details.cfm?link=http://newdeal.feri.org/days/0705.htm (last
visited June 19, 2010); Timeline of Legal History of Women in the United States, NAT'L
WOMEN'S HISTORY PROJECT, http://www.legacy98.org/timeline.html (last visited July 23, 2010).
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"direct-allocation reforms" because they pursue the same objective as the
aforementioned common law at-will exceptions: equalizing the employer-
employee power imbalance by directly giving individual workers greater levels
of direct control over their employment relationships.
C. The Reciprocality of the Direct- and Indirect-Allocation Approaches
Despite the implementation of these exceptions to the at-will scheme,
individual workers in the contemporary American labor market still maintain
very marginal leverage over their employers because employers enjoy a
perpetual surplus of available labor during a period of high unemployment and
underemployment, especially in unskilled fields.61 Unskilled workers are most
adversely affected by, and most vulnerable to, demand fluctuations in the labor
market; but, they are also the group that is least protected by organized labor
unions. 62 Ostensibly, these workers' plight would be improved through some
form of collective bargaining.63  By joining together through labor unions,
these workers theoretically would be able to gain greater leverage in the
workplace, thereby improving each of their disadvantaged positions relative to
their employers. 64 However, due to a confluence of factors, namely the ability
of employers to terminate union-minded employees, the historically hostile
political climate regarding union-enabling legislation, and the current fractured
condition of the unions themselves, policies like the EFCA, that merely make
it somewhat easier to form organized unions, provide insufficient protections
to vulnerable American workers. 65  Additional reforms are also needed todirectly combat the inequities built into the at-will employment scheme.
61. See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Williamson, The Historical Content of the Classical Labor Surplus
Model, 11 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 171, 172-73 (1985) (describing the relationships of the
labor surplus model); Gustav Ranis, Labor Surplus Economies (YALE UNIV. ECON. GROWTH
CTR. DIscussioN PAPER NO. 900, 2004) 1, 2, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfinabstractid=631206.
62. The American Federation of Labor (AFL), which, together with the Congress of
Industrial Organizations (CIO), forms the largest union organization in the United States,
historically has been accused of harboring hostility toward unskilled foreign workers, allegedly
viewing them as "scabbing wage-breakers unreceptive to unionization." Fraser Ottanelli,
Immigration and American Unionism, 58 INDUS. REL. 346, 346 (2003) (reviewing VERNON M.
BRIGGS, JR., IMMIGRATION AND AMERICAN UNIONS (2001)). However, this lack of
representation is also owed, in large part, to the efforts of behemoth employers, such as Walmart
and McDonald's, to actively and heavy-handedly prevent unionization. Ester Reiter, Serving the
McCustomer: Fast Food is Not About Food, in RETHINKING SOCIETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
(MICHELLE WEBBER & KATE BEZANSON EDS., 2d ed. 2008).
63. B. Hepple, Flexibility and Security of Employment, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW
AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES, 282 (R. Blainpain & C.
Engels eds., Kluwer Law Int'l 6th & rev. ed. 1998).
64. See, e.g., WAYNE N. OUTrEN ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES AND UNION
MEMBERS 316-17 (2d ed. 1994).
65. See HOGLER supra note 41, at 4-5, 8 (outlining the significant obstacles that prevent
union involvement).
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Accordingly, by expanding protections found in currently-recognized
exceptions to the at-will doctrine, the specific balance of power between an
individual worker and her employer could be more equally and equitably
distributed. Although the federal statutory exceptions mentioned above apply
uniformly in every jurisdiction, the three common law employment-at-will
exceptions (implied contract, implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
and public policy) are applied inconsistently among the states. 66  These
common law exceptions are afforded varying degrees of recognition in
different jurisdictions-some states, like California, recognize all three;
67
others, such as Colorado and Oregon, recognize only some; and still other
states, like Alabama and Georgia, recognize none of these exceptions.
69
Federal reform is necessary because, by incorporating the policies underlying
these common law exceptions into federal law, they would apply equally
throughout every United States jurisdiction. 70  Such reform would not only
enable workers nationwide to gain greater individual power in relation to their
employers, but would in turn, provide all affected workers with fundamentally
greater levels of certainty and security in their positions.
Moreover, a strategic federal expansion of certain at-will exceptions would
benefit other reforms that utilize the indirect-allocation approach. The basic
theory underlying indirect-allocation reforms is that unions can secure for
workers, inter alia, better working conditions, compensation, and benefits by
negotiating on behalf of workers as a group. 71 In the end, union action
provides workers with greater power individually, but the method in which this
occurs is somewhat circuitous-a group of employees first grants its
bargaining power to the union, which then negotiates with employers as a
proxy for these employees, and, after the union obtains the most favorable
terms practicable, this power is then transferred back to individual employees,
66. See infra Part III.A. Map 1, Part III.B. Map 2, Part III.C. Map 3.
67. FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 16, at 137-41.
68. Id. at 141-43 (noting that Colorado recognizes the public-policy exception, but not the
implied-contract or covenant of good faith and fair dealing exceptions); id. at 207-09 (explaining
that Oregon recognizes the implied-contract and the public-policy exception, but not the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing).
69. Id. at 131-33, 150-52.
70. This equality would exist at least to the extent that employers are under the purview of
Congress's Commerce Clause jurisdiction. See infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
Presumably, small employers without a sufficient connection to interstate commerce would likely
be exempt from such legislation; Title VIl of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits
employer discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, only has
jurisdiction over employers affecting interstate commerce and employing "fifteen or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006). Any federal legislative reform
contemplated in this Article would likewise face a similar limitation.
71. See, e.g., DOCHERTY, supra note 20; OUTTEN ET AL., supra note 64, at 7, 316-17.
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commonly in the form of beneficial terms of a collective bargaining
agreement.
72
In comparison, the direct-allocation method secures greater power for
workers in a more immediate fashion. By directly transferring enhanced levels
of job certainty and security to individual workers, the workers' leverage as
individuals would be increased from the outset, which would not only benefit
that worker in her specific relationship with her employer, but would also
ultimately allow a greater allocation of power to labor unions in the aggregate.
This interchange illustrates the symbiotic, catalytic, and reciprocal relationship
of direct- and indirect-allocation reforms; when individual workers are placed
in more advantageous positions vis-A-vis their employers, unionization efforts
can be bolstered, strengthened, and empowered. Their combined, potential
effectiveness would be much greater than under either approach in isolation.
III. DIRECT ALLOCATION GENERALLY: MINING THE COMMON LAW FOR
INSIGHT INTO A FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE EXCEPTION
What form should a legislative direct-allocation reform take? If the ultimate
objective is to obtain fairer employment relationships, it is tempting to jettison
the entire at-will employment system altogether. Other countries, including
Canada and Western European nations, utilize a "for cause" (also known as a
"just cause") termination system, as compared to the American at-will
approach.73  In these countries, labor statutes "explicitly require pre-
termination hearings before an employer dismisses an employee for
misconduct, so as to provide the employee with the opportunity to confront and
respond. 74 The realization of such an approach in the United States would
signal a momentous shift in employer-employee relations and would
accomplish, on a greater scale, the certainty-based objectives that the common
law at-will exceptions currently promote. Further, the implementation of a
national "just cause" employment system would provide crucial job security
for American employees and work to halt the vicious cycle of job cuts,
mounting unemployment insurance expenses, welfare and food-stamp filings,
rising rates of unemployment and foreclosure, lower tax inflows, and rampant
government deficits. 
5
Nevertheless, the implementation of such an approach is fatally infeasible in
the current American political and legal landscape. As discussed above, in the
United States, although several important federal workplace statutes have been
enacted, most employment laws and policies are set by individual states,
causing wide variability in the different states' approaches to employment
72. See OUTrEN ET AL., supra note 64, at 316-17.
73. Hepple, supra note 63, at 298-99.
74. Grodin, supra note 41, at 147.
75. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 59:965
Power Allocation in the American Labor Market
76law. Hence, a complete overhaul of the current employment-at-will scheme
and the implementation of an across the board "for cause" system would
require one of two extremely unlikely options: a coordinated, simultaneous
adoption of a "for cause" system by all fifty jurisdictions, or a federal
reorganization and preemption of all states' employment law jurisprudence.
Clearly, the first scenario is highly improbable, as evidenced by the states'
varied recognition of the different common law at-will exceptions.77 Despite
the willingness of certain states, such as California and Montana, to reject the
employment-at-will doctrine outright, others have hesitated to discard the
doctrine to any degree.78 Next, an overarching federal imposition of a "for
cause" scheme seems likewise implausible because it would be politically
untenable for the federal government to overtake the states' decision-making
power in a traditionally domestic area, such as employment and labor law.
79
Therefore, because it appears highly unlikely that a federal "for cause"
employment system will be adopted in the United States in the immediate
future, the enactment of a more incremental type of reform to the at-will
scheme would provide the most effective course of action. Accordingly, this
Article will now examine the various common law exceptions to the at-will
scheme as they are variously recognized in different states, looking at each
reform's level of support, scope, and overall effectiveness. This analysis
provides insight into the most prudent types of incremental federal legislative
reform. In effect, the existing variations between the currently recognized
common law exceptions will be used as a barometer to gauge the most
effective and politically feasible federal direct-allocation legislation.
76. See FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 16, 131-236 (reviewing the
recognized exceptions to the doctrine of employment-at-will in the fifty states and the District of
Columbia); see also supra notes 41-67 and accompanying text.
77. See FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 16, at 131-236.
78. See, e.g., Whitt v. Harris Teeter, Inc., 614 S.E.2d 531, 532 (N.C. 2005) (holding that
wrongful constructive discharge is not a claim under North Carolina law, thus emphasizing the
use of at-will employment in North Carolina). Both the North Carolina and South Carolina
Supreme Courts have refused to recognize certain exceptions to the at-will doctrine, including the
implied contract and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See id.; Hessenthaier v. Tri-
County Sister Help, Inc., 616 S.E.2d 694, 698 (S.C. 2005) (refusing to find that policies listed in
the company's handbook created a contract); see also FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYMENT LAW,
supra note 16, at 198-99, 214-15; Nexsen, Pruet, Adams, Kleemeier, LLC, North and South
Carolina Supreme Courts Bolster Employment-at-Will Doctrine, EMPLOYMENT LAW UPDATE,
(Aug. 2005), available at http://www.nexsenpruet.com/assets/attachments/227.pdf.
79. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 n.4 (1985) ("We cannot declare
pre-empted all local regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships
between employees, employers and unions; obviously, much of this is left to the states." (quoting
Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 289 (1971))); see also, HOGLER, supra note
41, at 19-20 (discussing the role of the federal government and state governments in the
regulation of employment).
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A. The Implied-Contract Exception
The implied-contract exception to the at-will doctrine provides that an
employer's assurances to an employee, including those found in employee
handbooks, can form the basis for employment contracts. 0 This exception is
recognized in thirty-eight jurisdictions in the United States; however, even
among states that recognize this exception, there is divergence regarding its
scope.81 Some states recognize a weaker version of this exception, where onZ
written assurances can form the basis for an employer's implied contract.
Other states accept a more robust version in which an employer's oral
representations to employees can form an implied contract, even in cases
where the employer disclaims these statements as not contractually binding.
83
80. See Muhl, supra note 42, at 7-8.
81. See id. at 7-9 (discussing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880
(Mich. 1980)). Compare Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Mich.
1980) (finding enforceable a "for cause" provision contained in an employer's policy statement
that created an expectation ofjob security even though there was no agreement as to the duration
of employment), with Mullinax v. John's Wholesale Jewelry, 598 So.2d 828, 840 (Ala. 1992)
(holding that ambiguous representations about the longevity of employment made during hiring
negotiations did not create a secure position for the employee).
82. See Mullinax, 598 So.2d at 840 (refusing to find an implied contract based on oral
assurances); see also Walsh & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 651-53.
83. See Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 884; see also Walsh & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 651-
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The most common use of the implied-contract exception is to enforce
provisions found in employee handbooks that often state an employee will only
be terminated "for cause" or outline specific disciplinary procedures in the case
of poor workplace performance. 85 In addition, this exception has been applied
to a broad range of other scenarios, such as when an employer indicates that an
individual will remain employed so long as she "did a good job and performed
adequately, '86 or when an "employee's longevity of service, regular raises,
promotions, oral assurances of continued employment or lack of meaningful
criticism of the employee's work' 87 causes that employee to reasonably
assume she will only be fired for just cause.
84. Muhl, supra note 42, at 7; Walsh & Schwartz, supra note 16, app. 1, at 678-89.
85. Muhl, supra note 42, at 7-10.
86. FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 16, at 174; see Walker v.
Consumers Power Co., 824 F.2d 499, 503 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding that testimony regarding
assurances of job security if the employee performed adequately was enough to create a cause of
action for wrongful termination).
87. FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 16, at 138; see Foley v. Interactive.
Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 387 (Cal. 1983) (holding that personnel practices and policies may be
considered when determining if an agreement against at-will termination exists).
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The implied-contract exception has the potential to grant a substantial
amount of power directly to workers and provide a greater level of workplace
certainty and security for at-will employees. As compared to the "normal" at-
will relationship, if an employer forms an implied contract with its employees,
it must abide by the terms of that agreement, thus significantly limiting that
employer's ability to "freely terminate" its employees. 88 These obligations
provide employees with higher levels of certainty regarding the conditions
under which they will continue employment, thus making each worker more
confident in his ability to retain that position-that is, workers enjoy greater
job security by actively avoiding actions that under the manual or contract
constitute grounds for termination.
Politically, however, it is unclear whether effective labor reform can
practically be implemented through the implied-contract exception. First, as
evidenced by the distribution of jurisdictions that recognize this exception in
Map 1, there is a large divide between those jurisdictions that recognize a weak
form of the implied-contract exception and those that have adopted a more
robust version of the exception. 90 Although over three-fourths of all states
recognize the implied-contract exception in some form, these jurisdictions are
split; twenty-two states adopt the weaker form of the exception and sixteen
recognize the robust form. 9' Accordingly, these figures demonstrate that a
fundamental lack of consensus exists among the states regarding the proper
scope of this exception or whether it should be recognized in the first place.
Further, reform based on the implied-contract exception must contain either
the weak or robust version because the purpose of enacting a single federal
scheme is to create uniformity and consistency between jurisdictions.
Undertaking such a reform, however, would necessarily create tension between
the states that believe the robust form goes too far in exposing employers to
liability and those that feel the weak form does not adequately protect at-will
employees. Nevertheless, given the relatively high number of states that
recognize a weak form of the implied-contract exception (twenty-two) and the
low, but not insignificant, number of states that do not recognize this exception
in any form (twelve), the most politically feasible manifestation of this
exception probably would most resemble the weaker version. 92 Not only
would the federalization of a weak version of the implied-contract exception
enjoy support from those states that already recognize it, but it would also
serve as a compromise between the states that use the robust form and those
that do not recognize the exception at all. Moreover, the sixteen states that
88. See, e.g., Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 890.
89. See id. at 892.
90. See Muhl, supra note 42, at 7; Walsh & Schwartz, supra note 16, app. 1, at 678-89.
91. See Walsh & Schwartz, supra note 16, app. 1, at 892.
92. See Muhl, supra note 42, at 7-10; Walsh & Schwartz, supra note 16, app. I, at 678-89.
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already recognize the robust form of the implied-contract exception would be
free to continue doing so by enacting or retaining appropriate state laws.
93
Political considerations aside, a weak version of the exception would
ultimately prove less effective in that it covers only written assurances, such as
policies contained in employee handbooks and manuals, and would undermine
the protection this exception is theoretically capable of providing.94 For this
reason, employers could easily avoid triggering this exception by simply
eliminating or revising any portions of employee handbooks that could provide
the bases for implied contracts, such as provisions relating to job security,
discipline, or termination. This is especially true for large institutional
employers with legal departments capable of striking out potentially offensive
language from manuals. Thus, despite its potential superiority in terms of
political feasibility, the federal implementation of a weak version of the
implied-contract exception would likely only provide negligible protection for
workers in the end.
The robust version of this exception, on the other hand, would undoubtedly
offer greater protection for workers because it would permit employees to rely
on an employer's representations, thus providing a more equitable and
balanced employment relationship. Still, for the reasons discussed above, the
federal enactment of a robust implied-contract exception appears quite
unlikely.
95
Ultimately, after considering the practical ramifications of a federal implied-
contract exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, it appears that this
option offers both poor political feasibility and marginal effectiveness. The
robust variant offers substantial worker protection, but would likely be
unattainable politically; the weak variant is more politically palatable, but
provides only minimal security for American at-will employees.
B. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The next common law exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (implied covenant). This
exception presents an even greater deviation from the at-will scheme than the
implied-contract exception and, depending on the jurisdiction, it provides
"either that employer personnel decisions are subject to a 'just cause' standard
or that terminations made in bad faith or motivated by malice are prohibited.,
96
Due to both its breadth and ambiguity, this exception is recognized in only
eleven U.S. jurisdictions (see Map 2).
93. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
94. Muhl, supra note 42, at 7-8.
95. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
96. Muhl, supra note 42, at 10.
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Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Exception to Employment-At-Wll Doe
0 Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing exception recognized; claims may be brought an either contraci
ea Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing exception recognized; only contract-based claims alloived
F1 Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing exception not recogmzed
The implied-covenant exception is mostly confined to the western United
States. 98 Among the states that recognize this exception, there is an almost-
even split regarding the breadth of this exception and the remedies available to
wrongfully-terminated employees. 99  A robust federal version of this
exception, which would effectively put a de facto "for cause" termination
scheme in place, would unquestionably provide the most protection for
American workers. In contrast, a weaker version of the implied-covenant
exception would provide terminated employees narrower causes of action,
such as bad faith or malice, and would restrict the available range of
remedies. 100  Political considerations aside, a national implied-covenant
exception would have a tremendous equalizing impact on the American
workplace in terms of both quality and certainty because this exception would
permit employees to sue their employers in contract or tort for a wide range of
97. Id. at 4; Walsh & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 652, app. 1, at 678-89.
98. Muhl, supra note 42, at 9; Walsh & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 652, app. 1, at 678-89.
99. Walsh & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 652, app. 1, at 678-89.
100. Id. at 649-50, 654.
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wrongful-termination violations. 10 1 In California, for instance, the jurisdiction
with the most expansive implied-covenant doctrine, an employee can sue her
employer for everything from fraudulent inducement10 2 to the intentional
infliction of emotional distress.' By broadly expanding the grounds on which
employees may sue, a federal implied-covenant exception would encourage
employer forthrightness and fairness as well as provide workers with a stronger
sense of security in their employment. In other words, reform of this type
would provide a leap, rather than a step, toward nationwide workplace
equality.
Nonetheless, because it goes far in transferring workplace power from
employer to employee, the federal enactment of an implied-covenant exception
seems unlikely. Among jurisdictions that currently recognize the robust
variant of the implied covenant, there is no consensus regarding its proper
scope, and the implementation of a full-scale "just cause" termination
scheme borders on the impossible in the present political and economic
climate.10 5 For these reasons, a weak variant of the implied covenant remains
the more-likely option. Still, a majority of courts in the thirty-nine
jurisdictions that do not recognize the implied-covenant exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine have explicitly rejected its adoption.
10 6
Accordingly, with nearly eighty percent of U.S. jurisdictions having explicitly
rejected the implied-covenant doctrine and in light of the fragmentation among
jurisdictions that utilize this exception,' °7 it seems especially unlikely that a
political impetus exists for the federal enactment of any variant of the implied-
covenant exception.
C. The Public-Policy Exception
Finally, the third and most popular common law exception to the at-will
employment scheme is the public-policy exception that protects workers if an
employer's actions violate a "well-established public policy of the State."
10 8
101. Id.
102. FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 16, at 140 (citing Lazur v. Super
Ct., 909 P.2d 981 (Cal. 1996)). A California plaintiff successfully sued his employer for
"fraudulent inducement of the employment contract" because the employer, "in the process of
recruiting[,] made fraudulent misrepresentations to the plaintiff, who, in relying on those
statements, left a secure position in New York to be 'groomed' to assume a management position
with the employer in Los Angeles." Id.; see Lazur, 909 P.2d at 983-84.
103. FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 16, at 140. This tort claim is
generally restricted to cases where the employer's conduct was "extreme and outrageous." Id.
104. Walsh & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 653-55, app. 1, at 678-89.
105. See supra note 77-80 and accompanying text.
106. Muhl, supra note 42, at 10.
107. See id. (noting that only eleven states recognize the implied-covenant exception and that
"[t]he majority of courts have rejected reading such an implied covenant into the employment
relationship).
108. Id. at 4.
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The public-policy exception is applied in a wide range of cases, including
those in which an employee is terminated for "filing a workers' compensation
claim after being injured on the job, or for refusing to break the law at the
request of the employer."'
0 9
Mai 3110
Public Policy Exception to Employinent-At-Will Doctrine
E Public Policy exception recognized based on state statutes and constitutio in addition to concepts of equity.
fairness, and public good
Public Policy exception recognized based only on state statutes and constitution
El Public Policy exception not recognized
The public-policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is
recognized in forty-three states (see Map 3) and, like the other common law
exceptions discussed above, its scope and efficacy varies by jurisdiction."
109. Id.
110. Id. at 5; Walsh & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 647-49, app. 1 678-89.
111. Walsh & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 647-5 1; see, e.g., Merrill v. Crothall-Am. Inc., 606
A.2d 96, 100-01 (Del. 1992) (recognizing that every employment contract in Delaware has an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing but requires a showing of fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation by the employer); Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1253-
57 (Mass. 1977) (limiting the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to instances where already-
earned benefits were denied upon termination); K-Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1365,
1367-70 (Nev. 1987) (restricting the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to only those
instances when a relationship of trust and reliance first exists); Wilder v. Cody County Chamber
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Some states recognize a weak variant of the exception that, in effect, limits its
application to cases in which policies found in the state's constitution, statutes,
or administrative rules are at issue." 12  Other jurisdictions adopt a robust
version of the exception that, in addition to constitutional, statutory, and rule-
based protections, also contemplates the aims of public policy more broadly,
including for example, policies that provide the "proper balance . . . between
the employer's interest in operating a business efficiently and profitably, the
employee's interest in eaming a livelihood, and society's interest in seeing its
public policies carried out." Accordingly, the public policies embodied by
this exception vary by state given the statutes, constitutions, and case law of
each.
Nonetheless, for several reasons, a national implementation of this exception
would mitigate this divergence among states. First, the current interstate
discrepancy over the propriety of each version of the exception would become
largely irrelevant because a national public policy could be developed from
federal legislation and there would be less need to resort to common law
considerations of what constitutes "fairness" or "public good."' 14 Moreover, if
federalized, discrepancies resulting from the inherent differences in states'
underlying statutory and constitutional law would become moot, as federal law
would form the underlying basis of the exception, rather than state
constitutions or statutes. 1 Therefore, a federal public-policy exception could
provide reform that is not only practical in terms of implementation, but also
offers a relatively popular and widely-accepted method for attacking the
inequalities of the employment-at-will scheme.
Ultimately, however, a federal adoption of the public-policy exception may
only provide narrow protection to vulnerable workers. First, the exception
may be superfluous if there is already relevant codified law that illegalizes
specific employer conduct. Second, because some variant of the public-policy
exception exists in forty-three states, its federalization would have the.... 116
strongest impact on the remaining seven jurisdictions. Nonetheless,
of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 220-21 (Wyo. 1994) (finding that a breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is dependent upon the relationship of the parties).
112. Muhl, supra note 42, at 4-5.
113. Id. at 6 (quoting Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (I11. 1981)).
114. See supra Part II.B; see also Walsh & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 650-54.
115. See supra Part I.B (discussing the split among jurisdictions recognizing the implied-
contract exception); see also supra Part III.B (discussing those jurisdictions that recognize the
implied-covenant exception).
116. Muhl, supra note 42, at 4. New York and Florida, ranked the third- and fourth-most
populous U.S. states respectively, are among the jurisdictions that do not recognize any form of
the public-policy exception. Id. at 4. Population statistics suggest that the federal enactment of a
public-policy exception may affect a larger number of workers than jurisdictional rates of
acceptance indicate. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION FOR
THE UNITED STATES, REGIONS, STATES, AND PUERTO Rico: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2009
(2009), http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html.
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although this exception may lack a certain level of breadth, it compensates in
terms of its flexibility and feasibility in implementation. As illustrated in Map
3 above, broad-based support exists in most jurisdictions for a public-policy
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, even though its ability to shift
the workplace power imbalance nationally may remain fairly limited.
1 17
IV. PICKING SIDES: DISTILLING COMMON LAW EXCEPTIONS TO DEFINE THE
CONTOURS OF A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
A. Underlying Basis of Legislative Reform
The question now, is: what light can these common law exceptions shed on
the implementation of a broader federal statutory exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine? It appears that some support may exist for
reforms that provide greater levels of employment certainty and security to
workers, similar to those found in the implied-contract exception. 8  Such
reforms would safeguard employees from certain instances of unforeseen
termination by making an employer's assurances enforceable. Furthermore,
certainty-based reforms would provide protection to American workers
because the employment-at-will doctrine offers laborers minimal, if any, job
security.119
It is unclear what insight the implied-covenant exception would provide into
the formation of legislative labor reform. Although the federalization of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing could create a paradigmatic
shift in the employer-employee power balance, currently such reform is both
overambitious and politically unattainable.' In the end, the lack of national
support for the implied covenant underscores the need for incremental reform.
If the goal is to provide as much workplace equality as possible, then
something resembling a "for cause" system may be the most fitting option.
The states' sparse recognition of the implied-covenant exception highlights the
fact that a more effective strategy would be a gradual, measured approach,
rather than the wholesale imposition of an entirely different employment
regime.
117. See Muhl, supra note 42, at 4-7.
118. See supra Part III.A; see also Mark R. Kramer, The Role of Federal Courts in Changing
State Law: The Employment at Will Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 227, 244 n.84
(1985) (acknowledging how legislative acts have reduced the employer's power over the
employee); J. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employment Law and the Common Law: A Modest
Proposal to De-Marginalize Employment Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 347, 370-71 (1995) (noting how
wrongful discharge legislation has provided relief to employers and employees by working to
strike a balance between competing interests); Jack Steiber & Michael Murray, Protection
Against Unjust Discharge: The Need for a Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 319, 336
(1983) (arguing that the appropriate remedy for unjust discharge problems is federal legislation).
119. See supra Part II.B.
120. See supra Part III.B.
[Vol. 59:965
Power Allocation in the American Labor Market
Additionally, there appears to be relatively broad support for an at-will
exception based on codified public policy. 12  The protection that this reform
could ultimately provide workers, however, would likely be narrow in scope
and effectiveness. Still, an exception based upon public-policy considerations
would allow for flexibility in implementation. Moreover, because of its broad
popularity, a public-policy exception also appears to be the most politically
feasible option.
B. Delineating the Exception
When considering the appropriate form for federal legislative reform to the
at-will scheme, it is paramount to keep these distilled objectives in mind. The
most effective and feasible federal employment reform would combine the
certainty and security features of the implied-contract exception with the
narrow scope and widespread popularity of the public-policy exception.
Crafting a federal at-will exception along these lines would provide the most
protection for American workers because it would directly address the.- .122
certainty prong of the current employment predicament. Further, this
legislative reform must be incremental as the implementation of a full-scale
just-cause employment system in the United States is unlikely to occur in the
foreseeable future. 123  Incremental legislative reform would provide a
compromise between the blunt, and often arbitrary, impact of the at-will
system upon American workers and the adoption of a full-blown "for cause"
scheme.
1. Legislative Background
In order to understand how such reform would be enacted, it is important to
review the process Congress will use. Congress's ability to implement
legislation regarding labor and employment law is derived, mainly, from the
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which empowers Congress to
regulate interstate commerce. 24 Prior to the 1995 Supreme Court decision
United States v. Lopez, Congress's ability to enact legislation by means of the
Commerce Clause was virtually unconstrained. 125 Limitations on this power
121. See supra Part III.C.
122. See supra Part II (discussing the two-pronged employment crisis).
123. See supra Part II.B.
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see BENJAMIN W. WOLKNSON & THE MSU EMPLOYMENT
LAW GROUP, EMPLOYMENT LAW: THE WORKPLACE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYERS
412 (2d ed. 2002) ("All federal legislation covering employment is grounded on the commerce
clause of the US constitution, the right of Congress to regulate interstate commerce." (emphasis
added)).
125. Compare Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that Congress may
regulate a purely local activity, as long as it has a substantial direct or indirect effect on interstate
commerce), with United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (limiting Congress's
power to regulate activity that substantially affects commerce and emphasizing the need to apply
the test of substantial relation).
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were imposed in Lopez and its progeny, 126 but Congress still maintains a
relatively high level of discretion concerning the labor reforms it can
effectuate. 127  Moreover, because labor legislation relates to employment
relationships and workplaces, it bears a stronger relationship to commerce than
other laws the Court has struck on Commerce Clause grounds in the past
fifteen years. 28  Through its Commerce Clause powers, Congress has
implemented a variety of federal legislative initiatives that fall under the broad
umbrella of labor and employment policy; these include workplace protection
for whistleblowers,' 29  free trade agreements,13  workplace safety
regulations, 13 1 child labor laws, 132 mandated minimum wage and improved
workplace conditions,1
33 family 6 and medical leave,
134 organized labor, 135
pension plans and retirement, and a host of anti-discrimination laws.'
37
Accordingly, Congress's ability to enact meaningful reform involving the
direct allocation of workplace power to employees would likewise fall within
its broad Commerce Clause powers.138
126. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000) (striking down the
"Violence Against Women Act" on Commerce Clause grounds); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
127. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57 (holding that the level of
scrutiny legislation must meet to satisfy the Commerce Clause is the "substantial effects" variant
of the rational basis test, meaning that the law at issue must regulate those things that
substantially affect interstate commerce); see also WOLKINSON ET AL., supra note 124, at 412-
13; supra note 65 (discussing the threshold requirements for employees under other federal
employment legislation, such as Title VII, and explaining that Congress's commerce power
would not permit it to regulate smaller employers outside of interstate commerce).
128. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006); Fair
Labor and Standards Act of 1938, id. §§ 201-219; Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
id. §§ 651-678; Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), id §§ 1001-1461; Social
Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397jj (2006); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (striking a
gun control law as violating the Commerce Clause).
129. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-9(i), 5851, 6971, 7622, 9610
(2006).
130. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 19 U.S.C. § 3332 (2006);
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act
(CAFTA-DR), 19 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4111 (2006). Although free trade agreements are not typically
considered pro-worker policies (at least for domestic workers), they still fall under the general
heading of employment and labor laws.
131. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (2006).
132. See, e.g., Fair Labor and Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 212 (2006) (regulating child labor).
133. See, e.g., id. §§ 201-219 (2006).
134. See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654
(2006).
135. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
136. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§
1001-1461; Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397jj (2006).
137. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
138. See supra Part II.V.
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2. The Use of Notice Provisions to Reform the At- Will System
Requiring employers to notify employees in writing before terminating them
is one reform that may meet the above objectives. Currently, due to the
abovementioned variability in states' recognition of employment-law
doctrines, there is no consistent interstate rule regarding pre-termination
notice. 139 Nevertheless, a uniform notice requirement could be enacted in the
form of legislation based on policies found in current federal legislation. One
such legislative enactment is the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification (WARN) Act. 140 The WARN Act requires certain employers with
over one-hundred employees to provide sixty-days' notice to workers before
closing entire plants or terminating all of a facility's employees.' 4' Although
the scope of the WARN Act is limited to large-scale employers and contains
many exceptions-including cases involving temporary layoffs, reductions of
work hours, terminations of portions of a facility's workers-it provides
workers with a higher degree of certainty in that they are better able to
anticipate their impending terminations.
142
A federal expansion of this notice requirement could provide workplace
security to a greater number of American workers by either broadening the
scope of employees covered by the notice provision, such as including smaller
employers or requiring notice in cases where the employer is less than certain
of impending terminations, or eliminating some of the current exceptions in the
WARN Act. Certainly, broader notice legislation still would include statutory
exceptions, such as those allowing for immediate termination in cases of
workplace crimes or gross recklessness, natural disasters, or failing
companies. 143  These exceptions aside, the enactment of a more expansive
139. See supra Part III (demonstrating the lack of uniformity among state employment laws).
140. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) of 1989, 29 U.S.C. §§
2101-2109 (2006).
141. Id. § 2102(a). In the United Kingdom, Parliament enacted the Contracts of Employment
Act 1963 and the Employment Rights Act 1996, which require employers to give reasonable
notice to employees before termination. Contracts of Employment Act, 1963, c. 49, § 1 (Eng.);
Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 9, § 86 (Eng.); HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 631 (4th ed.
1991). Further, the Employment Rights Act mandates that employees must be given a "fair
dismissal," which is very similar to the implied covenant of good-faith and fair-dealing exception
to the at-will system. See Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 1, § 94 (Eng.); HALISBURY'S LAWS
OF ENGLAND, at 80.
142. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a) (2006) (restricting the applicability of the WARN Act to
employers with more than one hundred employees and requiring notice for discharge, but not for
various exceptions, such as lay-offs and reductions in work hours).
143. See id. §§ 2103-2104 (outlining the exemptions of the WARN Act). As with all rules,
the devil is in the details; for legislation, the devil is in the exceptions. In any employment
scenario, there will be workers who must be terminated immediately because of gross
misconduct. Unless an employee's presence poses a danger to others or economic ruin for the
company, all workers, whether terminated with or without cause, should be governed by the same
rule. Administratively, this would be the most prudent approach because it would eliminate the
need for excessive legislation. Rather than determining the subjective question of whether cause
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notice requirement would be a positive step toward rebalancing the employer-
employee power dynamic. By requiring employers to provide notification prior
to termination in more cases, employees would be better able to accommodate
for unemployment, seek new jobs, and prepare unemployment insurance
filings. In this regard, it would help blunt the at-will scheme's harsh blow
upon workers and provide them more certainty in their employment.
3. The Use of Warning and Cure to Reform the At-Will System
Alternatively, and perhaps additionally, employers could be required to
provide written warnings to underperforming employees prior to termination
and allow these workers a cure period in which to fix their faulty performance.
This approach, although somewhat similar to a notice provision, is narrower in
scope and broader in potency. It is narrower in the sense that it only would
apply to individual employees whose work the employer deems substandard,
rather than to termination generally. On the other hand, warning and cure
legislation is broader than a mere notice requirement because it would give a
warned worker the opportunity to cure his poor performance and retain his
position. Especially if implemented in tandem with a general notice provision,
a warning and cure requirement would provide a substantial infusion of
certainty and security for workers. 144 Moreover, the innate benefits that a
general notice provision could provide a warned worker (e.g., time to prepare
for periods of unemployment, search for new employment, and file
unemployment claims) would also flow from a warning and cure requirement,
but to a greater degree because underperforming employees have the
opportunity to re-secure their current employment.
Nonetheless, the implementation of a federal warning and cure system in the
United States is unlikely given that it would effectively create a for-cause
system. Administratively, such legislation would be difficult to enforce
because a warning and cure requirement would give rise to at least two stages
of litigation or administrative hearings--one stage relating to whether an
employer had sufficient "cause" to issue a warning, and another to decide if the
employee had sufficiently cured her defective work after receiving a warning
so as to avoid termination. If wrongfully-terminated employees are given no
recourse through litigation or other proceedings, then warning and cure
legislation would prove toothless. Moreover, a warning and cure provision
would likely force employers to put extensive record-keeping procedures in
place to better document grounds for "cause," increase workplace tension
existed, the only necessary inquiry would be whether notice was given, a more objective question.
The United Kingdom gives the employee a right to appear before a tribunal that determines the
fairness of his or her termination. See Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 2, § 111-112 (Eng.).
This process, however, would complicate the appealing simplicity of the notice requirement
discussed above and would unnecessarily burden both the employer and terminated employee.
144. See supra Part IV (discussing how a general notice requirement would provide greater
security for employees).
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during the cure period, and impose additional litigation costs upon both
employer and employee. Accordingly, although a warning and cure system
would provide workers much protection, its application in the present
American setting too closely resembles the for-cause system and, for many of
the same reasons, would likely fail.
145
4. Severance
Another type of legislative reform would require employers to provide
severance pay and health benefits to terminated employees. Currently, there is
no federal or state statute requiring employers to provide workers with
severance pay upon termination. This exception goes one step further than
the notice and warning and cure proposals by requiring employers to continue
compensating terminated employees, even if new workers have been employed
in their stead. Nonetheless, there are some mechanisms that provide protection
for workers on this end-for example, bargaining agreements between
employers and labor unions sometimes contain contracts that provide
severance pay to terminated employees. 147  Additionally, the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) provides terminated employees
with the option to continue healthcare coverage under the same plan they
enjoyed during employment. 48  These schemes, however, do not provide
sufficient worker protection for two reasons. First, bargaining agreements
containing severance packages would apply only to workplaces large enough
to have active unions. Due to the overwhelming decline in unionization over
the past half-century, 49 many industries, even those of considerable scale, are
unable to obtain severance agreements due to a lack of representation by
organized labor. Second, COBRA requires recently terminated employees,
themselves, to pay for healthcare costs if they elect to continue their
coverage. 15  Moreover, COBRA benefits are limited to employers with more
than twenty employees, 15 1 are available for a period of only eighteen months
following termination, i52 and are restricted to instances where termination
results from a statutorily defined "qualifying event."'
' 53
145. See supra Part III.
146. See OUTrEN ET AL., supra note 64, at 111.
147. See id. at 109, 11i. If an employer does offer severance plans, the terms are governed
by ERISA. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1461 (2006); OUTrEN ET AL., supra note 64, at 111.
148. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161(a), 1162(l), 1163(2) (2006).
149. See infra Part V; supra text accompanying notes 30-36.
150. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(3).
151. Id. § 1161(b).
152. Id. § 1162(2)(A)(i).
153. Id. § 1161(a) ("The plan sponsor of each group health plan shall provide ... that each
qualified beneficiary who would lose coverage under the plan as a result of a qualifying event is
entitled, under the plan, to elect ... continuation coverage under the plan."); see id. § 1163
(defining and explaining "qualifying event").
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Of course, a federal severance-pay statute would contain many limitations,
exceptions, and exemptions that would exclude many workers from coverage.
Excluded workers could include those employed by very small employers;
non-employees such as independent contractors; and employees terminated for
"just cause," natural disaster, or a company's failure.' 54 Requiring employers
to provide severance pay to terminated workers would impose significant costs
upon them, especially for the myriad of employers already suffering during the
present economic downturn. Additionally, inflicting unaffordable expenses on
already-foundering employers may, in the end, harm more workers in the
aggregate if these employers are unable to continue operating due to additional
expenses. Moreover, even with broad limits, however, the implementation of a
federal severance-pay provision is unlikely because the costs it necessarily
imposes on both employers and employees would effectively erode most
congressional support.
C. Settling on Notice
The most appropriate method of enacting direct-allocation reform is the one
that espouses the objectives of the common law exceptions to the employment-
at-will scheme;155 given such, a federal notice requirement is the best
approach. Notice legislation would provide incremental reform that is capable
of balancing the competing objectives of effectiveness and feasibility, as well
as directly allocating workplace power to employees by granting workers
greater levels of certainty in their employment relationships and allowing them
to collect damages in cases where employers fail to provide proper notice of
termination.156
Although a federal notice requirement may not go as far in balancing the
employer-employee power dynamic as other legislative proposals discussed in
this Article, what it lacks in terms of potency, it makes up for in practicality.
Whereas a warning and cure requirement for underperforming employees
would be fatally unadministrable, resulting in litigation, 157 and a severance
requirement would be prohibitively expensive and politically infeasible, 158 a
notice requirement would not implicate any of these problems, or would at
least do so to a lesser degree. Furthermore, enacting a national notice
requirement would not burden employers with additional expenses because,
ostensibly, the only costs involved would be those needed to furnish written
notice to employees facing termination. Moreover, a notice requirement would
be much less likely to require federal "for cause" litigation or hearings than
would a warning and cure provision. Nevertheless, litigation may arise
154. See, e.g., supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
155. See supra Part 111.
156. See supra Part IV.B.I.
157. See supra Part IV.B.2.
158. See supra Part IV.B.3.
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regarding the statutory exceptions to this notice requirement; for example, if a
worker challenges whether she was properly terminated without notice for
criminal behavior, gross recklessness or negligence, company failure, or
natural disaster. Still, this risk is insignificant for two reasons. First, only a
small minority of cases would trigger these types of claims. Second, federal
notice legislation could be accompanied by the creation of an administrative
agency charged with overseeing its implementation, which could provide a
lower-cost, administrative alternative to litigation.
159
Further, all of the proposals outlined above, whether notice, warning and
cure, or severance, involve a tradeoff between political feasibility and
effectiveness. Of all the proposals, a notice requirement would be the smallest,
most incremental step toward a system resembling a for-cause scheme. In
itself, this incrementality may seem to be a rather feeble form because, relative
to the other reforms, it would not initially grant much power to workers.
However, this shortcoming would be mitigated by the fact that a notice
requirement would also bolster indirect-allocation reforms, making them
increasingly widespread, effective, and lasting.
160
V. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN DIRECT- AND INDIRECT-ALLOCATION
APPROACHES: WHY DIRECT-ALLOCATION REFORM IS NECESSARY
A federal notice requirement would not empower workers in isolation; this
direct-allocation reform would instead operate in conjunction with the already
implemented instruments of the indirect-allocation approach of the American
labor market. 161 These could work in symbiosis with one another because
unions will inevitably benefit from the aggregate increase in negotiating
leverage. In addition, the enactment of direct-allocation reform would
compensate for some of the underlying problems facing the current indirect-
allocation approach, thereby protecting American workers on a wider scale.
Direct allocation is, therefore, necessary to fill the gap between the current
state of American employment-law jurisprudence and the unions' objective of
expanding coverage in the future.
159. For example, such an agency could function like the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) that fields and investigates complaints of employer discrimination. U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Authority & Role, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
index.cfm (last visited July 23, 2010). Alternatively, it could operate like the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) that investigates allegations of unfair labor practices and brings credible
claims before a federal administrative law judge or panel of judges. NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS
BD., THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AND YOU: UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES, available
at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/sharedfiles/brochures/engulp.pdf.
160. See infra Part V.
161. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members -
2009 (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [hereinafter Bureau of
Labor Statistics].
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Direct-allocation reform is more plausible when contrasted with the
uncertain future of pending union legislation. 62 The EFCA is one of the most
significant union-enabling 1pieces of legislation to be considered by the
Congress in recent years. The provisions of the EFCA, which provide
harsher penalties for employers that violate the rights of workers, are
immediately necessary. 164 Due, in part, to the overwhelming decline of
unionized workers over the past half-century, 65 key indicators of workplace
quality, such as average wages compared to inflation, health benefit coverage,
and work/life balance, have continued to lag behind other industrialized
nations. 66 Proponents of organized labor argue that the need for immediate
pro-union reform is plain. As former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich recently
lamented
The decline of unions is not the only reason for the long-term
slowdown in American wages. Much of what Americans used to
make can now be made more cheaply abroad or by automated
machines. But the vast personal-service sector of the economy is not
affected by imports or automation, including millions of jobs in big-
box retailers, fast-food outlets, hotel chains, hospitals, construction,
and transportation. Few of these jobs are unionized. All too often
that's because employees who want to form unions are threatened by
their employers. And if they don't heed the warnings, they're fired,
even though that's illegal .... The sooner [the EFCA is] enacted, the
better-for American workers and for the American economy. 67
Despite its necessity, the EFCA's enactment seems increasingly unlikely.
Although its passage in the Senate seemed promising at first, political
wrangling, including key Senators withdrawing support, may cause its
162. See Alec MacGillis, Union Bills Declining Changes give Rise to Alternatives, WASH.
POST, Mar. 29, 2009, at A5 (referring to the Employee Free Choice Act as the "landmark pro-
union proposal" before Congress).
163. Id; see also Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 1409, 111 th Cong. §§ 1-4 (2009).
164. Reich, supra note 34.
165. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 161.
166. Raising the Global Floor: Unprecedented New Study Finds that Family-Friendly
Workplace Policies and Protections Supoprt Jobs, Enhance Competitiveness,
PRNEWSWIRE.COM, Nov. 17, 2009, http://www.pmewswire.com/news-releases/raising-the-
global-floor-unprecedented-new-study-finds-that-family-friendly-workplace-policies-and-
protections-support-jobs-enhance-competitiveness-70283462.html.
167. Reich, supra note 34. Some critics have suggested that the bill was introduced, at least
in part, for political reasons, rather than its ability to aid workers. Matthew Austin, Why EFCA
Was Introduced Now, THE OHIO LABOR LAWYERS, Mar. 11, 2009, http://theohiolaborlawyers.
worldpress.com/2009/03/l l%20why-efca-was-introduced-now/. House and Senate Republicans
attempted to preempt the EFCA with the "Secret Ballot Protection Act," which would have made
it an NLRA violation to certify a union that was not elected through the secret balloting process.
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failure. 168 Accordingly, Congress is not expected to pass the EFCA at any
point in the immediate future. 16 9 Moreover, advocates of EFCA admit that,
even if the bill were enacted, it "likely would not increase union membership
until the economy improves, since workers are currently more concerned about
job security than wages and benefits."'
170
Even if pro-union reforms similar to the EFCA are effectuated, without
reform along the lines of direct-allocation legislation unions may not be able to
adequately address the problems discussed by Secretary Reich. Presently,
labor unions in the United States are in a fragmented and deteriorated state-in
2005, seven major unions left the AFL-CIO, creating a major rift in inter-union
relations. 171Since that point, organized labor has struggled to reunite into a
federated organization, and individual unions are deeply divided about the
future focus of such a federation. 172  Although a centralized, amalgamated
union configuration would most likely expand union representation to a certain
degree and offer somewhat more comprehensive representation for American
workers, in its current fractured form, the union system can accomplish
neither.
Nonetheless, in this current divisive political climate, opponents of
organized labor continue to blame unions for the inability of large, private-
sector employers, such as the American automotive and airline industries, to
juggle profitability and the current demands of unions under existing collective
bargaining agreements. 173  During tenuous economic periods, opponents of
organized labor argue that it is paramount for employers to maintain a high
level of flexibility in employment decisions, including the ability to
individually renegotiate wages, benefits, and hours of employment.!7 4 Even
168. See MacGillis, supra note 162. Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter signaled that he
would vote for the EFCA early on, but changed course and announced that he was withdrawing
his support for the bill. Specter could have been the sixtieth filibuster-beating vote. Id. In
addition, California Senator Dianne Feinstein indicated that she would no longer support the bill.
Oliphant, supra note 39.
169. MacGillis, supra note 162.
170. Lyric Wallwork Winik, Does America Still Need Labor Unions?, INTELLIGENCE
REPORT, Feb. 22, 2009, http://wwww.parade.com/news/intelligence-report/archive/does-america-
still-need-labor-unions.html.
171. Steven Greenhouse, Unions Face Obstacles in Effort to Reunite, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,
2009, at A 11.
172. Id.
173. See AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF PUB. UTIL., COMMC'NS AND TRANP. LAW, REPORT OF
THE AVIATION COMMITrEE: 2003 SPRING COUNCIL MEETING 1, 2, 4 (2003) (outlining the
relationship between the airline industry's economic downfall and the collective bargaining
agreements of labor unions). Some economists posit that unions act as cartels-although they
often secure wage increases and better working-conditions for members, they, in fact, reduce the
number of available jobs. Morgan 0. Reynolds, Labor Unions, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF ECONOMICs 2008, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/LaborUnions.html.
174. See Alvaro Santos, Labor Flexibility, Legal Reform, and Economic Development, 50
VA. J. INT'L L. 43, 49-50 (2009) (noting that the organization for Economic Cooperation and
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though periods of financial downturn and high levels of unemployment are the
most critical times to protect workers by retaining livable wages, benefits, and
work/life balance,' 75 the implementation of a federal notice requirement,
would provide employers with flexibility. Notice legislation would not modify
employers' obligations under collective bargaining agreements, nor would it
restrain employers' ability to hire or terminate workers as economic conditions
dictate. Presumably then, criticism of a bill that adopts some type of direct-
allocation approach would be less strident than that of union-enabling
legislation like the EFCA.
Moreover, enacting a federal notice requirement would be a boon to union
activity and would empower future indirect-allocation reform because a notice
requirement would provide organized labor with a higher baseline position and
more leverage in negotiating future collective bargaining contracts. If, for
example, a labor union sought to include a severance or warning and cure
provision in its initial agreement, its negotiating position would be stronger if a
universal notice requirement were in place. In effect, the incremental nature of
a federal notice requirement would help pave the way for further union-
initiated workplace improvements. These small, yet significant reforms stand
in sharp contrast to the steady declines in workplace quality and certainty over
the past half-century. By enacting legislation that directly works to balance the
employer-employee power dynamic on an individual level, American workers
in the aggregate can become more certain of their positions and begin the
process of rebuilding a more secure, equitable, and balanced employment
system overall.
VI. CONCLUSION
The global financial meltdown has had a particularly devastating impact on
the workforce in the United States and has inflamed the entrenched problems
already facing American labor. American workers are faced with plummeting
work-life quality in terms of sinking wage levels, increased working hours, and
sparse healthcare benefits, but the lopsided nature of the American at-will
employment scheme also leaves them with little-to-no job security. This
Article has highlighted how legislation that aims to directly balance the power
disparity between employer and employee would form an effective step toward
the amelioration of the second arm of problems facing workers, namely those
relating to workplace certainty and security. By exploring the possible
alternatives of direct-allocation reform, a federal notice requirement has
emerged as the most practicable approach. This legislation would not only
provide greater employment certainty, but it would also offer a higher
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likelihood of implementation than existing initiatives that focus solely on
union-enabling measures.
Correspondingly, this approach potentially could bolster and fortify unions'
ability to take meaningful action to address the current labor predicament.
Ultimately, if labor unions and their advocates seek to reassert an expanded
role in the American workplace, the need for future labor reforms is evident.
Yet, due to the current fractured state of unions and a persistent political
aversion to union-enabling reform, the ability of pro-union legislation alone to
revitalize and reestablish wide-scale organized labor representation is doubtful.
Accordingly, the implementation of a federal notice requirement would
provide a more viable, politically feasible alternative. Such reform would
neither be an end in itself nor a panacea for the ailments of vulnerable workers
in the United States; instead, this reform offers the potential to spur broader
labor reform initiatives and, as importantly, represents a positive step toward
greater overall certainty, security, and equality in the contemporary American
labor market.
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